Stages Of Innovation And When To Wage Wars

Benedict Evans wrote, as always, an excellent and thought provoking piece on the state of smartphone innovation. In this piece he mentions the following;

slowing innovation in the iPhone and in Android doesn’t mean weakness (“Apple doomed!” “Android falling behind!”) but strength: it reflects the fact that we are in a phase in which they’re unassailable. The fact that almost all of the white space has been filled in – the big problems solved – also means that we have left the part of the S Curve in which a new idea or execution could overturn the incumbent. They’re too feature-rich and, of course, have too much scale in units and ecosystem.

The main point here is that slowing innovation does not signal a weakness. Benedict attributes this to being at a phase where the incumbents are too entrenched that nothing could overturn them. I agree that this is certainly one aspect, but I wish to add one more thing. That is a portfolio management perspective. The growth-share matrix tells us that new companies will tend to enter businesses from the “Question mark” quadrant, high-growth markets with the potential to become lucrative. Conversely, companies will not invest in slow-growth markets but instead try to milk them. Therefore, from both a business incentive perspective (the growth-share matrix) and from a capability perspective (Benedict’s point), innovation will slow down in maturing markets and the threat of new entrants will also decrease.

Of course, that is only true until the next S curve comes along and resets the score, just as the iPhone did to both Microsoft and Nokia.

I also agree to this point, and would like to provide a different perspective. Assume you are a company like Microsoft or Samsung, a company that valiantly tried to create a mobile operating system that would challenge iOS and Android. Now what should your strategy be? Being held hostage to Google’s Android is obviously no fun, and your hope is that you will somehow control the ecosystem. We have seen how developing a smartphone OS did not work, most likely due to the reasons above. Instead, your strategy should be doing your best to capture the next S curve.

The work Samsung has been doing for its Tizen OS-based wearables is therefore a very sensible strategy. They have positioned themselves well in preparation for growth in this market. This is a war that Samsung has been wise to fight.

One final point that I would like to note is that although we are seeing slower innovation in smartphone features, this is not necessarily the case for the business models around low-cost hardware. We are seeing many low-end entrants in the handset market, and this is proof that there are many companies seeing growth opportunities. There will continue to be significant business model and manufacturing innovations in the low-end, and smartphones will continue to be exciting, especially in developing markets.

How Can Android Wear Succeed?

I know I’m very late to the party, but I recently noticed this post via a comment on “The Overspill” newsletter by Charles Arthur.

“Until we have an Apple Watch of our own, no one is going to take Android Wear seriously (opinion)” link

Essentially, this article calls on Google to create their own Android Wear watch instead of leaving this to their partners.

If Google is serious about Android Wear, it should be serious about building Android Wear watches – full stop. Only Google has the long-term motivation to keep the platform alive, and only Google can afford for its hardware business to be a zero-sum game in the name of building up an ecosystem. Without our own “Apple Watch” to act as a guidepost, as proof that a better smartwatch can be made, Android Wear seems doomed to continue on in stagnation and obscurity.

Of course, the problem with this argument is that it does not align with how Android nor Windows became popular. Google did not have to build its own phone for Android to gain steam. Similarly, Microsoft did not have to make its own PC to make Windows popular. In both cases, the respective companies followed a strict OEM partnership strategy. Essentially, this argument suggests a lack of understanding on why Android and Windows became popular in the first place.

  1. Both Windows and Android gained popularity on the back of the success of the Macintosh and iPhone respectively.
  2. Both Windows and Android were low-end alternatives to the Macintosh and iPhone. They did not necessarily bring something new, and in fact they started out being downright inferior. They were however cheaper.
  3. Due to the success of the Macintosh and the iPhone, customers were already aware that a GUI and a touch-based smartphone were very good ideas and that they would be useful. Apple had already educated customers to the benefits, and had primed the market. All that Google and Microsoft had to do was to make the same benefits accessible to the rest of the market.

So applying this to the state of smartwatches, we can foresee the following scenario that would take us to the success of Android Wear.

  1. Apple will continue to work hard to educate customers on the benefits of a smartwatch. Apple will explore what features resonate, and what a smartwatch would actually be useful for (something that is still quite ambiguous).
  2. Once the Apple Watch starts selling something like 20-30 million units per year, then a) customers will be fully aware of the benefits of a smartwatch and b) Google will know what to make.
  3. Then all that Google needs to do next is to collaborate with their partners to develop such a smartwatch that is half the price of an Apple Watch, and to bring the benefits to Android users. Importantly, it is OK for this smart watch to be downright inferior. Since Android users are currently >80% of the smartphone market, there is a potential for Android Wear watches to exceed Apple Watch sales someday.

My point is, Google does not need to make its own smartwatch. Doing so would not move the needle one bit. Instead, what Google needs to do is to keep their OEMs cosy until Apple Watch goes mainstream, and make sure that their team can pounce then. The risk here is that Samsung is going their own way with Tizen OS, and will not be with Google when the moment arrives. Google has to make sure that Sony, LG and others will not follow suite, and this is indeed the only meaningful thing they can do.

The funny thing is even among the huge tech giants, it is only Apple that can predictably make a new category product go mainstream. All the rest can do is follow.

Uber The Colonist

It seems that Silicon Valley is at last waking up to what Uber really is.

  1. “Monopoly as the Uber Business Model”
  2. “Understanding That Unregulated Monopoly Was Always Uber’s Central Objective”

I am a bit disappointed that it took this long for Silicon Valley to see this, but I suppose better late than never.

Over a year ago, I wrote this;

The question is will Uber be a sustainable business? Will it raise prices after venture capital runs out and there is no competition left? If they are forced to employ their drivers as employees and if they have to also pay for their driver’s cars, which is quite possible long term, can they still maintain current prices? If Uber becomes a monopoly, will they be any better than the regulated monopolies before them for both the drivers and the customers? I have serious doubts on this, and unless Uber discloses the sustainability of its business, commits to future low prices and the welfare of its drivers, I think that strictly regulating Uber makes a lot of sense. The last thing that you want is for Uber to kill your local taxi industry, and replace it with one which is just as expensive (potentially more) and where all the profits are funnelled to a Silicon Valley company far away. This is why we have anti-trust laws, for example, and this is why we regulate industries (like the public transport, mail, health and food industries) that directly affect the welfare of our citizens.

The point that I want to emphasise is that if the US is killing itself as a result of its relaxed views on anti-trust and disdain for regulation, then so be it. I do not mind the world’s largest superpower shooting itself in the foot.

I am however not OK with how the US is exporting this to other countries. If Uber is killing local taxi industries in developing nations, preventing the deployment of public transport by providing an artificially cheap option, and in general making these countries dependent on the US for basic needs, then I see this as a new form of colonialism. This is what Gandhi fought against with the Swadeshi movement.

And we should also note that this is not restricted to Uber. One could argue that the stagnation of tech in developed countries has caused Silicon Valley giants to search for growth in the developing nations, and their huge resources are allowing them to use predatory, money-losing tactics. It’s just that since the US is inherently an inwards-looking country and nowhere near being truly cosmopolitan, they don’t realise how much damage they’re causing.

Just see how much China’s Internet has prospered by shutting out Silicon Valley.

If Silicon Valley wants to earn money in developing nations, I see no problem in doing so. However, they must compete on equal terms. They must earn profits. For example Apple is OK because even in developing countries, they charge the same price (which turns out to be super-premium in these places). Apple does not drive out local competitors, but encourages them to copy and provide the same features at lower prices (again, look at China). Local cheap competitors thrive because of Apple.