More on Attractive Profits in the Cloud

I’ve been touching on the subject of commoditization of the cloud a couple of times on this blog(1, 2.

Today, I’ll like to look at the current players and how a possible commoditization of the cloud will affect their businesses. That is to say, do the current players own an adjacent layer in the value chain that can reap the attractive profits.

Barb Darrow at GigaOM, citing Rick Sherlund from Nomura Securities, gave some estimates on which companies are are making money from their cloud business (below). It is clear that Amazon AWS is losing it’s position as the dominant cloud vendor. The other companies, Salesforce, Microsoft, IBM and Google are significantly narrowing the gap. Microsoft and IBM in particular have very high growth rates relative to AWS.


Given that cloud services are in many ways similar to rental servers, and that it is probably difficult to maintain differentiation, it is likely that prices will drop and cloud services will commoditize. When commoditization happens, Christensen’s “law of conservation of attractive profits” predicts that the attractive profits will shift to an adjacent layer in the value chain. Here I would like to see if the current players in this market will be able to capture the profits as they shift.

  1. Microsoft, IBM: Both of these companies are very strong in enterprise IT. As the cloud commoditize and enterprises move their data centers into the cloud, Microsoft and IBM could easily provide value through consultation and customized services. They are both well positioned to take advantage of cloud commoditization.
  2. Salesforce: Similar to Microsoft and IBM, Salesforce will benefit through consultation and customization for the cloud services.
  3. Amazon: I can’t see any of Amazon’s strengths in the layers adjacent to the cloud. I don’t see them benefiting at all from commoditization of the cloud.
  4. Google: Google makes almost all of it’s money from advertising, and it doesn’t make much money (at least not directly) from other activities. Hence it is difficult to say whether they are capturing profit or not in any of their activities other than search. Likewise, it is difficult to discuss how the commoditization of the cloud will affect them.

Understanding Microsoft’s Business

Jan Dawson recently broke down Microsoft’s revenue and growth by business segments. This helped me to understand the significance of the enterprise segment and at least partially understand the direction in which it is moving.

Points that caught my eye;

  1. Windows revenue is dominated by sales through OEMs. “Windows OEM revenue” is 15.5% of total whereas “Retail and other sales of Windows” is only 0.5%. This means that very few consumers upgrade Windows themselves, and continue to use the OS that shipped with their machine. This suggests consumers are indifferent about the new features provided with new Windows versions. When you think about the new features in Mac OS Yosemite, you realize that a lot of these are actually about integration with iOS devices and not about Mac OS X itself. It’s something worth thinking about.
  2. Consumer Office revenue (3.0% of total) is puny compared to Commercial Office revenue (25.0% of total). Although this may suggest that Google Docs is dominating in the consumer space, I think this may also suggest that consumers don’t really use Office suites very much. I have seen very little data strongly supporting either possibility.
  3. Server products are really quite strong. It’s amazing that sales continue to rise despite the rise of cloud computing. I would really like to understand what is happening here, and whether this strength will continue.

Microsoft Now Officially Weeding Out Chromebooks with Price Assault

I’ve been writing quite a lot on this blog about Chromebooks. This is because it is a case study into what qualifies for a disruptive innovation and what does not. This story also tells us that corporate history is one yardstick we can use to determine whether or not the incumbent will address the threat of disruption head-on, or whether they will flee up-market.

My position which dates back to January 2013, is that Chromebooks will follow the fate of Netbooks. In fact, since the sales of Chromebooks are significantly lower than peak Netbooks, it will likely end as a dud that only the tech industry showed any interest about.

The thinking was very simple, and all I did was say that;

This time, if Microsoft decides to fight back, they would start providing Windows 8 cheaply to low-spec models like the Acer. They would also add free SkyDrive capacity. It is also likely that they would include free Office 365 to compete with Google Docs.

Microsoft has now officially started to do this.

Microsoft COO, Kevin Turner is cited as saying;

“We are going to participate at the low-end. We’ve got a great value proposition against Chromebooks, we are not ceding the market to anyone.”


Microsoft is not invincible and there is no guarantee that fighting Chromebooks head-on will be net positive for Microsoft. It is possible that the low-end Windows devices will cannibalize Windows revenue without generating new revenue from Office 365, etc. What we do know however is that Microsoft’s corporate culture has repeatedly addressed low-end disruption head-on. It will undercut low-end disruptors if they ever gain a foothold.

This is simply a case of Microsoft doing what it has always done once again.

Japan’s Largest University Switching to Microsoft Office 365 from Google Apps (Docs)

The largest university in Japan, Nihon University will provide “Office 365 Education” for all of its 100,000 students according to the Microsoft Japan website.

I’m still in the process of researching the details, but some things that have been mentioned that I find very interesting;

  1. Nihon University had been using “Google Apps Education Edition” since April, 2007.
  2. Reason 1: Faculty staff used Google Apps but student uptake was not good. Students preferred to use their own free mail accounts.
  3. Reason 2: Unfamiliarity with Google Apps was a reason for slow uptake. By providing the software that everybody is familiar with (Office), Nihon Univ. hopes that students will also use scheduling and address book features.
  4. Reason 3: Students were pirating MS-Office install disks. Office 365 will make that a non-issue. Nihon Univ. chose the A3 plan with Office 365 ProPlus, which means that faculty and students can install Office on 5 PCs per user.
  5. Annual price per faculty is 410 JPY, per student 230 JPY. This ends up being cheaper then when they were using “Google Apps Education Edition” because even when they were using Google, they still needed to buy significant installations of MS Office.

Although we still need more examples to see whether this is a trend or not, I sense strong beginnings.

Cloud is getting cheap

The most powerful allure of Google Apps is the price. For general consumers and for education, the price is free. This was possible because Google had a robust advertising model. By injecting ads in the web user interfaces, Google could justify the cost of providing the service for free.

Historically, Google was uniquely positioned to provide an office suite for free. Other companies could not do this profitably.

However, as technology improved and the hardware required for cloud services dropped in price, it became feasible for companies without a robust advertising model to provide free or very cheap cloud services. This can be witnessed in the recent announcement at Apple’s WWDC 2014. Apple announced that they would be providing CloudKit effectively for free.

We are now at the point that we don’t even need advertising anymore. It has become feasible to provide free or very cheap cloud office suites, even without advertising. Hence anybody can do it. Google no longer has a unique advantage in providing services for free.

Google Apps never became “good enough”

With the cost advantage of Google Apps eroding, the argument for choosing either Google Apps or Office 365 now rests on the benefits that each platform provides. This is something that Google Apps was never designed for.

Since its inception, Google Apps was designed as a simplified version of MS Office that justified its existence by being much cheaper. Although it had some unique collaboration features, it never evolved to become better than MS Office. It was always obvious that if it lost its cost advantage, it would lose out against MS Office.

Looking at the reasons why Office 365 was chosen over Google Apps, it’s very apparent that Office was still an application that both faculty and students needed to use from time to time. Google Apps had never become “good enough” on its own.

Microsoft is changing

Since the costs of providing cloud services had decreased, the only roadblock for Microsoft going aggressive with Office 365 was the possibility of cannibalization. Office 365 could potentially cannibalize sales of their standalone office suite.

A few thing have happened that might have changed their minds.

  1. Adobe has been very successful with their Adobe Creative Cloud.
  2. Microsoft’s new CEO is a cloud guy.

What are the trends?

These are the trends that I think we are beginning to see.

  1. Google’s strength in advertising will no longer be sufficient to maintain an advantage (based on cost) in the cloud. Cloud costs have gone so low that advertising is no longer necessary for a free/low-cost service. Subscription services are proving to be a good business model.
  2. With the price issue becoming less of a concern, competition in the cloud will focus more on features and usability. In established markets, one feature that will continue to be extremely important is compatibility with de-facto standards (both in file-formats and user interface).
  3. As the focus shifts to features and usability, native applications will maintain their advantage against web apps.

There’s Still Time Left for Microsoft Tablets

Nine months ago, back when the flattening of iPad sales had not yet become obvious and when the majority of analysts were predicting tablets to soon imminently replace notebooks, I wrote quite a bit about Microsoft (in Japanese).

In summary, I wrote;


The largest factor determining whether a disruption succeeds or not is whether the incumbents respond in time. “In time” is defined by whether the entrant product has evolved to the point where it can fully replace the incumbent. In the context of Microsoft, it is defined by whether the combination of a smartphone and a tablet can replace a PC. If the answer is yes, then Microsoft cannot retaliate. Otherwise, a counterattack will still be effective.


Tablet still cannot replace PCs. In particular, Android tablets are skewing towards 7-inches and are focusing on entertainment. The tablet market is not moving towards doing work. Hence, tablets are unlikely to replace PCs.


Because of the vast resources they can deploy, incumbents rarely lose once they retaliate in time. In the case of Microsoft, I think they still have time.

Apple has released their sales figures for 1Q2014 and the sales of the iPad have clearly flattened. Although iPad sales volumes (~ 20 million units) are still very impressive, at this level, it does not look like they are on a trajectory to replacing PCs.

So Microsoft still has time.

In fact, the new Surface Pro 3 clearly shows that Microsoft understands this. Instead of launching a hastened response to the iPad which was the original Surface RT, they have launched a product that attacks from their dominant strength in PCs and office productivity software. They have realized that laptops are not going to be replaced by tablets any time soon, and that sales of Windows laptops will continue to surpass the sales of iPad-like productivity tablets. Hence their dominant power, although weakened, will still be a formidable asset for the foreseeable future.

So instead of starting afresh, they are playing their strengths and using their resources wisely. Instead of attacking tablets head on, their plan seems to be to embrace and to internalize tablets into their laptop products.

This clearly makes sense.

Of course, it will take time. But Microsoft has realized that it has time.

Microsoft’s Record Quarter

Microsoft reported record revenue for 4Q13. Tim Anderson has a good summary on his blog.

The overall trend is;

  1. Sales to corporates is doing very well.
  2. Cloud services are also doing well, although the size is still very small.
  3. Consumer side software is not doing well.
  4. Devices (Xbox and Surface) are growing.

If we look at Microsoft’s traditional strengths which are software for both consumers and corporations, we see that they are going in different directions; consumer software is declining whereas corporate software sales are strong. Corporate software sales are their largest segment, so its a good thing that that is growing.

Many people would say that their weakening consumer sales are a cause for concern and that eventually corporate sales will also start to fall. However, evidence for this is weak. With the limited information that we have, especially about the corporate market and how this will evolve, I don’t think we can reasonably know what will happen to Microsoft in the future.

I would like to take a bit of time to summarize how Microsoft came to be this strong in corporates, and gain some perspective as to how things might pan out.

Microsoft serially disrupted corporate IT

Microsoft can best be seen as a serial disruptor. In many times of their history, you can see how they created a simpler software product that ran on low-end hardware. This enabled them to enter an existing market from the low-end, and from there, Microsoft relentlessly improved their product to eventually capture the high-end.

  1. BASIC: The BASIC interpreter was what got Microsoft started. It was a low-end derivative of FORTRAN that ran on the emerging personal computers of that time. As Windows became prevalent in PCs, BASIC evolved to become Virtual Basic, an easy-to-learn programming language, which was used even by non-professional programmers to create simple corporate IT solutions.
  2. MS-DOS: Because IBM did not initially consider personal computers to be very important, the IBM-PC used off-the-shelf components and out-sourced its operating system to Microsoft. MS-DOS itself was a low-end operating system. It was initially based on QDOS, the “Quick and Dirty Operating System” written by Tim Paterson. Microsoft improved MS-DOS so that although it was still very simple compared to sophisticated UNIX operating systems, it was good enough for the personal computers of that time. Eventually Microsoft create Windows which evolved to gain multi-processing and memory management, and this enabled Windows to even move up-market to snatch away the workstation market and the server market from UNIX.
  3. Server Products: At the time Microsoft introduced server products, their main competitor was UNIX. UNIX was difficult to administer and required familiarity with the command line. Windows server products could be managed from the GUI and were much simpler. Hence people with basic training could now administer servers for which there was huge demand due to the exploding popularity of the Internet.

Because of this history or starting out at the low-end and then moving up-market, Microsoft has managed to capture multiple key footholds in the corporate IT value chain.

Corporate IT software takes a long time to switch platforms

Corporate software solutions can live for a very long time. Consider how long COBOL systems are still being used.

The rapid take-up of Windows was not because Windows replaced legacy systems. It was because there was a sudden need to put computers on the desks of every office worker and to provide email and Intranet services. Windows was competing with non-consumption.

Now that Windows is so dominant in the workplace, there is little possibility of any non-consumption remaining. The only other way an entrant could penetrate corporate IT is to attack from the low-end hoping that Microsoft would retreat up-market. This cannot succeed primarily because corporations are generally reluctant to switch their current platforms, and secondly because Microsoft’s culture is to defend the low-end.


Even though mobile platforms are gaining in popularity, I see little reason to predict that this will encourage corporate IT to change their platforms. The more likely scenario is the inverse; that mobile platforms will have to adapt to the requirements of legacy corporate IT solutions.

If so, the end result is that corporate IT will have to support more devices, not less. This would mean more servers, more licenses, more corporate IT solutions. Microsoft’s record quarter is no fluke. I expect them to continue to have strong corporate revenue.

Of course Microsoft would like to own the mobile market as well so that they could provide and end-to-end solution. However, they would still remain in a strong position even if they couldn’t.


2013年10月22日のアップルイベントで新しいMacbookやiPadが発表されました。新しいMac OS XのMavericksやiWork, iLifeも発表されました。



これは結構大きい話です。今までもMacOS Xの価格は非常に安く、Microsoft Windowsよりもずっと手頃でした。例えばMountain LionはUS$19.99でした。初代MacOS X 10.0のCheetahはUS$129で、これも当時のWindowsと比較して廉価でしたが、手頃ではありませんでした。MacOS X 10.4 TigerはUS$129.95。この価格設定はMacOS X 10.5 Leopardまで続き、MacOS X 10.6 Snow Leopardで一気にUS$29になりました。MacOS X LionではいったんUS$69に上がりますが、MacOS X Mountain Lionでは再び下がってUS$19.99になります。




  1. ユーザは最新の機能を利用することができ、満足度が上がる。
  2. 新しいOSには開発者にとって便利な機能(API)がたくさん用意されており、より簡単により高度なアプリケーションが開発できる。
  3. 古いOSを使用する人が減れば、開発者は古いOSをサポートする必要が無く、負担が大きく減る。その上、積極的に新しいOSの機能が活用できる。


まとめると、短期的な収益を犠牲にしてでもOSを無料にする理由は、今後も積極的にMacOS Xに新しい機能をつけていくからです。逆にもしiPadを優先し、MacOS Xを収束させていこうと考えているのであれば、OSを無料にすることは戦略的には矛盾します。むしろMacOS Xユーザから最大限に利益を絞りだそうとするはずです(milking)。

なおGoogleの場合はビジネスモデルが違うので、GoogleがOSを無料化する理由は全く違います。GoogleがOSを無料にすることと、GoogleがOSのイノベーションにコミットするのは全く独立の話です。Googleの場合は、OSを有償にする選択肢がありません。Chrome OSは無料にしないと誰も使ってくれないのです。

iWork, iLifeが無料になった


ただこれは同時にGoogle Docsにとって、ちょっとやっかいな話です。

Google Docsの戦略は基本的にはこうです。

  1. パソコンのユーザはMicrosoft Officeを使っていることが非常に多い。
  2. Microsoft Officeを使う代わりにウェブで同じ作業をしてくれれば、そこにGoogleの広告を掲載することが可能になる。これがGoogle Docs。
  3. Google広告を掲載することにより、Google Docsは無料にできる。
  4. 非常に機能が多いMicrosoft Officeに完全に対応するのは無理なので、Google DocsはMicrosoft Officeの簡略版にとどめる。つまり機能は落ちるけど、無料だからいいやというローエンド製品。

GoogleはAndroidにしてもGoogle Docsにしても、Google Driveにしても、あるいは古くはGoogle Readerでもそうでしたが、普通だと有料なものを無料で提供することによって利用者を増やすと戦略をとります。


そして今回のiWork, iLifeが無料になったというのがなぜ衝撃かというと、Googleよりも安価なコンペティターが出現したからです。しかも品質的にも高級ブランドイメージ的にもGoogleを圧倒しています。

iWork, iLifeにはうっとうしい広告もありません。







Windows 8がスタートメニューを無くすなど、大胆なUIの変更を行いました。そして失敗しました。

Windows 8.1ではスタートボタンを復活させると言われています。

一方でAppleがiOS 7を紹介しているプレゼンテーションを見ると、彼らが大胆なデザイン変更の中にも継続性を非常に重視していることがうかがえます。

例えばiOS 7の紹介ビデオの3:28を見ると、Jonathan Ive氏は以下のように語っています。

While iOS 7 is completely new, it was important to us to make it instantly familiar. We wanted to take an experience that people know very well, and actually add to it. To make it more useful. To make it more enjoyable.



ではどうしてWindows 8では大胆な使い勝手の変更を敢行したのか?

スタートボタンだけではありません。タイルUIも今までのWindowsには無いものでした。Windows 95以来職場でWindowsを使っていた私でも、スタートボタンとタイルUIは全く理解できていません。Windows 8は“Instantly Familiar”では全くなかったのです。Microsoftはどうしてここまでやらなければならなかったのか?


Metro UI誕生の仮説


  1. MicrosoftはiPhone, iPad, Androidの脅威を非常に感じただろうと思います。一部の評論家はMicrosoftがモバイル対応が遅れたと論じていますが、過去のMicrosoftの行動や古くからWindows CE, Windows Mobileを開発した歴史を考えると、それは決してないだろうと思います。MicrosoftはNetscapeの脅威に対しても、Linux搭載Netbookに対しても、迅速に正面から対応した過去があります。したがってMicrosoftが悠然と構えていたと考えるよりは、Microsoftは迅速に対応しようとしたと考える方が正しいだろうと思います。
  2. Microsoftはむしろ過剰反応をしたのではないかと思います。10年も前からタブレット用のOSを作っていたMicrosoftは、すべてのパソコンがタブレットになる時代を誰よりも早く描いていました。Microsoftにとって、タブレットはパソコンそのものだったのです。したがってタブレット用のOSを別個に作ることは全く考えずに、パソコンのOSをタブレット用に作り替えようとしたのです。AppleのiOS Lionよりも遙かに大胆に、世の中のパソコンを一気にタブレットにしようと考えたのだろうと思います。
  3. 普通のパソコン用のOSでさえタブレット用にしようとしたため、最初に述べた継続性をMicrosoftは軽視してしまったのです。

こう考えると、Windows 8の失敗はタブレットの成功に対する過剰反応だったと言えます。


Windows 8の失敗はMicrosoftがおかしくなったからではなく、MicrosoftがMicrosoftであったが故にやってしまったものだろうと私は考えています。

そうそう、程度の差こそあるものの、Microsoft OfficeにリボンUIを導入したときも、かなりの拒絶反応はありました。それでも敢行したのがMicrosoft流です。

Steve BallmerとInnovator’s Dilemmaをはっきりさせる

Horace Dediu氏が“Steve Ballmer and The Innovator’s Curse”という題で、Innovator’s Dilemmaの視点からSteve Ballmerを擁護しています。

具体的には、既存の製品からの利益を最大化する経営戦略、つまり経営者に通常期待される戦略そのものがMicrosoftをInnovator’s Dilemmaに陥れたということです。したがってもしもSteve BallmerがInnovator’s Dilemmaを避けるようなことをしたならば、むしろその方が早くクビにされたのではないかと述べています。

Clayton Christensen氏のInnovator’s Dilemma理論を深く理解していないと得られない視点です。一般的な考え方と逆なので。

Horace Dediu氏は抽象的に議論していますが、私なりに具体的に考えたいと思います。

Microsoft ascended because it disrupted an incumbent (or two) and is descending because it’s being disrupted by an entrant (or two). The Innovator’s Dilemma is very clear on the causes of failure: To succeed with a new business model, Microsoft would have had to destroy (by competition) its core business. Doing that would, of course, have gotten Ballmer fired even faster.





Tablet PCについては、Microsoftはパソコンの存在を脅かすものを作るのではなく、パソコンの進化形を作ろうとしていました。ですから、パソコンプラスアルファをデザインしていました。当然値段もパソコンより高くなります。一方、Appleは引き算でiPadをデザインしました。パソコンからマルチタスク、マルチウィンドウを取り除き、キーボードを外しました。Flashを外したのはむしろかわいい方です。引き算と引き替えに、低価格、長持ちする電池、簡単な操作性を手に入れました。iPadだとデバイスの単価は下がりますので、Microsoftの利益は減る可能性があります(Netbookの時と同じように)。Tablet PCにしていけば、利益は変わりません。

If anything, Steve Ballmer avoided The Innovator’s Curse. Being successful with new market innovations would probably have led to an even shorter tenure. Destroying prematurely the pipeline of Windows in favor for a profit-free mobile future would have been a fireable offense. Where established large companies are concerned, markets punish disruptors and reward sustainers.

MicrosoftはWindowsとOfficeが収益の柱です。MicrosoftにとってのCloud戦略にしてもMobile戦略にしても、あくまでもWindows/Officeの売り上げを増すようにデザインされていました。モバイルOSのWindows CEはあくまでもパソコンのアクセサリーであって、パソコンとWindowsに変わるデバイスではありませんでした。そしてWindows TabletはWindowsに変わる低価格製品ではなく、付加価値をつけたより高級な製品でした。




MicrosoftにとってAndroid Tabletが普及してPCを代替するのが一番の脅威です。しかしAndroid Tabletは売れているものの、利用は余りされていないというデータが多数あります。特に企業には浸透していません。

今後のMicrosoftにしても、ヒステリックな方向転換をしない限り、継続してWindowsとOfficeを中心においた戦略を立ててくるでしょう。しかし世の中は完全にMobileに目が向いていますので、WindowsとOfficeの利益を確保することではなく、WindowsとOfficeの強い立場を利用してMobileを立て直そうとするでしょう。一旦はWindows 8やSurface RTで既存のWindows/Officeと縁を切るような大胆な戦略を試みましたが、これは失敗に終わっています。IntelのCPUも持ち直していますので、Windows/Officeの強みに乗っかった戦略がたてやすくなっているはずです。





Steve BallmerがMicrosoftのCEOを退任する方針になったことを受け、ウオール・ストリート・ジャーナルがヒステリー的な記事を並べていたので取り上げてみます。

  1. 「次期CEOの最大の任務:マイクロソフト企業文化を変える」
  2. 「マイクロソフトにはゲイツの伝統を破壊する人物が必要だ」



マイクロソフトの元・現従業員や業界幹部は、バルマーCEOの後任者が誰になるにせよ、その人は企業文化の再構築という難題に直面すると語る。その企業文化というのは、少なくとも目先は安全だが確実に収益が上がる道があまりにもしばしば優先され、イノベーションが阻害される文化だ。 前CEOのビル・ゲイツ氏と先週退任を発表したバルマー氏の下で、マイクロソフトは「オフィス」や「ウィンドウズ」といった人気商品に磨きをかけ、収益の原動力にした。








Windows XPが登場すると、MicrosoftはUnixと同様にマルチプロセスが可能で堅牢なOSを手に入れ、広く普及させます。おかげでMac OS Xが登場しても、またLinuxが洗練されていっても、ほとんど営業力だけで駆逐できました。2001年の登場から2006年のVista発売まで、Microsoftはずっとこのバージョンだけで圧倒的な市場シェアを謳歌しました。

ブラウザについても同じです。2001年のInternet Explorer 6の登場でNetscapeを葬り去ると、2006年のInternet Explorer 7までたった一つのバージョンで市場を圧倒しました。







  1. 確実に収益が上がる道があまりにもしばしば優先される
  2. 社内構造のために部署間の協力が簡単でない


例えばWindows XPの時は、「Unixと同じようにマルチタスクが可能で堅牢なシステムを土台に、Macintoshと同じ使いやすさを組み合わせれば爆発的に売れる」というのは明確でした。非常にはっきりしたゴールがありました。したがってWindows XPを開発するときには「確実に収益が上がる道があまりにもしばしば優先される」という企業文化はプラスに働きますし、目標が明確なので「社内構造のために部署間の協力が簡単でない」という問題も起こりにくくなります。





例えば1995年にBill Gatesが書いた“The Internet Tidal Wave”のようなものです。一番手の戦略としてではなく、二番手の戦略としてどうやって先行企業に追いついて行くか。どうやって真似していくか。そして苦手なイノベーションのスタイルをやめて、どうやってMicrosoftが得意な「真似て、追い越す」に全力集中するか。

特に後半の“Next Steps”を読むと、Bill Gatesは具体的な競合製品を挙げて、どのようにそれを代替する製品を開発するべきかを述べています。どのように自社製品をインターネット中心に統合していくべきかを述べています。会社の各部署がどのような改良をしていけば良いのかのロードマップを示しています。どれも大きなビジョンに基づいて語っているのではなく、極めて具体的なチャンスや危機から導かれている判断です。